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Book Review
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:

By Raoul Berger.
Harvard University Press, 1974. Pp.

A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH.

Cambridge, Massachusetts:
xvi, 430. $14.95.

In this volume, the third in what one reviewer has lavishly praised as
a "connected trilogy. . . one of the scholarly landmarks of our time,"'
Raoul Berger has arrayed the gleanings of his research into AngloAmerican constitutional and legal history in a scathing assault on
modern conceptions of the doctrine of executive privilege. Notorious
events of recent months, culminating in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the case of the presidential tapes, United States v.
Nixon,2 have presumably made unnecessary any definition of the term.
For the benefit of any reader who may have just returned from an
extended stylitic seclusion, it refers to the power, asserted to be derived
from the Constitution, of the President (and, under some formulations,
of lesser officials of the executive branch) to resist disclosure of information demanded by the other branches of government. While most
commonly asserted against congressional demands for documents within
the control of the Executive, the privilege is conceived by some as having
more or less equal application as against judicial processes, as instanced
by the contentions advanced on behalf of President Nixon in the "tapes
case," in which the Supreme Court expressed broad approval of the
privilege in general, while overriding it in the result.'
" Wills, Book Review, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, § 7 (Bool: Review), at 1, 2. The
-earlier two are R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREmE COURT (1969), and R. BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT:

-

U.S. -

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).

, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).

SThe Court's opinion appears not to have taken the slighl:est account of Berger's
book; at least there is no reference to it.This treatment was rather odd for a study
proclaimed just two months prior to the decision as a "scholarly landmark," Wills,
supra note 1, at 2, relating to a question to which the Court had not previously addressed
itself. It may be, however, that with the specter of presidential defiance not then having
been dispelled, any of the Justices who might have read Berger and been persuaded by
his thesis that executive privilege is a "constitutional myth," chose to keep their peace and
acquiesce in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in the interest of ha-6ng the Court speak with
one "definitive" voice. In any event, that opinion placed the Court's imprimatur on executive privilege as a constitutional postulate having substantia( weight and scope. It
was at pains to base the narrow holding on the peculiarly complling interest in making
all relevant evidence available in a criminal trial, when confronted with what was termed
the President's "generalized interest in confidentiality." U.S. at - , 94 S.Ct at
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Champions of executive privilege, academic and otherwise, have
uniformly pointed to the principle of separation of powers as furnishing
its constitutional underpinning.4 Their argument has been an essentially
"structural" one, in the sense Professor Black has used the term; that is,
dependent upon a logic deducible from the pattern of institutional arrangements established by the Constitution, rather than upon any exegesis of its text.5 It could hardly be otherwise. There is no language
anywhere in the Constitution conferring upon Executive an immunity
analogous to that explicitly accorded Congressmen by Section 6 of
Article I. The notion is, however, that were there not such a barrier
against efforts to extract confidential information in the possession of
the Executive, that branch would be impeded in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities. The Framers cannot be thought to have
intended that any branch be hobbled in its legitimate activities by encroachments on the part of the others. Thus it is argued that there must
be an implied constitutional power of the President and his principal
subordinates to withhold information if its disclosure would, in their
judgment, undermine the performance of executive functions. Management of military and international affairs are most frequently cited as
the prime examples of executive functions wherein a large measure of
3109. It implied that had the President invoked military or diplomatic secrecy, the claim
of privilege would have been entitled to absolute recognition on a basis not allowing of
even judicial scrutiny, much less judicial balancing of the privilege against the demand
for disclosure. Even in the absence of military or diplomatic secrets, the Chief Justice
laid great stress upon the protection to which any confidential presidential communication is due at the hands of the courts, and left open the possibility that claims of executive privilege might be renewed on a more particularized basis at the district court
level. The opinion did not, of course, speak to the matter of Congress' entitlement to
information in the face of assertions of executive privilege-the principal concern of
Berger's book-but in view of its frequent acknowledgment of the "great deference!'
which the doctrine of separation of powers was said to command with respect to such
assertions, it is not surprising that President Nixon's spokesmen were reported to have
found in it broad vindication for his position refusing full compliance with the House
Judiciary Committee subpoenas. For the tender treatment of executive privilege by the
courts generally, see Annot., 19 A.L.R. FFD. 472 (1974).
4 Scholars have tended to view the privilege as a qualified one, which should not be
taken as availing against any and all demands for disclosure. See, e.g., Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers,
20 U. PITT. L. REv. 755 (1959), and Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957). More practically-minded exponents of the privilege have generally inclined toward an absolutist position. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. 848, S. Con. Res. 30, S.1. Res. 72, S. xio6, S. 1x42, S. 1520,

S. 1923, & S. 2073 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, and the Subcomms. on Separation of Powers and Admninistrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., vol. 1, at 18-52 (1973) (testimony of Richard Kleindienst).
5C. BLACK, STRucrTUR AND RELATioNSHip IN CO NSTTUTONAL LAw (1969).
8
"[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place."

19741

BOOK REVIEW

secrecy is argued to be essential.
It is Berger's thesis that executive privilege and the arguments
adduced in its support are pernicious nonsense. Bristling with indignation at what he regards as shoddy and slapdash misinterpretations and
even misstatements of the historical evidence bearing upon the Framers'
intent by exponents of the privilege, Berger devotes the major portion
of this book to a reexamination of the historical data he regards as
pertinent to this issue. His premise is that the Framers specifically
intended the Executive to have no constitutional power to interpose
against Congress' plenary power of inquiry into all matters affecting
the commonweal, including foremost whether and how the President
and his subordinates are taking care "that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' In the author's view, "[w]hatever may be the merits of the
practical arguments for confidentiality.

.

.

.

[p]ractical desiderata

cannot be converted into constitutional dogma." (p. 186).
Berger, here and elsewhere throughout the book, appears to lay
himself open to the criticism of espousing an unduly simplistic approach
to constitutional interpretation which assumes that final and immutable
Truth respecting every question was once and for all formulated and
embodied in a text, and that all issues as they arise over time should be
concluded by efforts to discern the meaning of its author.' In a manner
resembling the biblical fundamentalist's attitude toward divine revelation, Berger seems to accord no place to traditio, the gradual unfolding
of doctrine through time in response to changing circumstances and
evolving perceptions, wherein new understandings emerge from the
accretive process of opposing assertions and acquiescenses, of countering
claims and denials. The inadequacy of a philosophy of constitutional
interpretation that focuses as exclusively upon the Framers' intent as
Berger's recurringly does must be acknowledged by anyone not prepared
to denounce the expansion of federal regulation areas which by the
criterion of "original intent" are clearly reserved for state and local
government.
In fairness to Berger, though, however much one might cavil with
his theory of constitutional interpretation as a general matter, it should
be borne in mind that this book is first and foremost a philippic against
those who, like former Attorney General William Rogers, 9 have pur7U.S. CoNsT. art. II,
8

§ 3.

This is essentially the criticism leveled at the book by Professor Winter in his recent review, Winter, Book Review, 83 YALL.. 1730 (1974).
9

See, e.g., SuBcoMm. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JuDIcIARY,85TH CONG. 2D SESs., THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO WITHHOLD INFORMA-
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ported to locate executive privilege specifically in the original constitutional understanding. It may indeed be characteristic of studies as
polemical as this that in terms of methodological premises, they tend to
mirror the arguments they are directed against, even as they reach
opposite conclusions. But if one is persuaded that Berger and his adversaries are playing the right game in the first place, Berger beats them
hands down at virtually every turn. At least, his scholarship ought to
pose severe embarrassment for anyone who would persist in seeking to
derive a warrant for executive privilege from the deliberations of the
Philadelphia Convention.
For Berger, the beginning and the end of constitutional explication lies in discerning the original intent which animated the text. He
does not, however, share the complementary fundamentalist notion that
such intent is discoverable from textual scrutiny alone, without recourse
to extrinsic evidence. While adept at the sort of textual explication
familiar to lawyers, the principal concern of this study is to assemble
and analyze the historical evidence left by the Founding Fathers, by the
thinkers whom Berger deems most influential in shaping their ideas of
government, and by the major figures of the early national period of our
history presumably most in touch with the pristine constitutional understanding on the subject of executive privilege. The effort to reconstruct,
from prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent statements and events,
what the Framers thought about some question which they failed to address explicitly in the document they produced has, of course, been essayed many times before, often in quest of unexpressed intent relating to
matters of greater import than executive privilege." The primary
sources of the most direct, contemporaneous evidence are the records of
the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist, and Elliot's Debates in
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
CoNmEss 74 (Comm. Print 1958). The so-called "Rogers Memorandum," written, or at least signed by, William P. Rogers as U.S. Attorney General under
President Eisenhower, has the dubious distinction of being the locus classicuas among expositions of executive privilege. Berger says of its "historical peregrinations" that they
are "a farrago of internal contradictions, patently slipshod analysis, and untenable inferences." (pp. 165, 164.) The tendentiousness of this document, promulgated over the
signature of the chief legal officer of the United States, is all the more appalling when
it is considered that opinions of the Attorney General are regarded as quasi-judicial in
character.
10 Most readily coming to mind are the studies by Charles Beard, Louis Boudin, and
William Crosskey purporting to establish, primarily by recourse to history, that the
Founding Fathers did (in the cases of Beard and Crosskey) or did not (in the case of
Boudin) intende to endow federal courts with the power of judicial review. C. BEA"n,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913);
L. BouDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932); W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
TION FROM THE
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From these and other sources, Berger adduces support for the proposition that the Framers generally entertained a pronounced suspicion of
executive power, and accordingly manifested in a variety of ways a
determination to make its exercise accountable to the Congress. In this,
his interpretation wholly accords with that of virtually everyone who has
studied the constitutional and political thought of the time, shaped as it
so largely was by American experience with an overbearing British king
and cabinet.
More questionable, however, is Berger's contention, largely
grounded upon the frequent reference in debate to the House of Representatives as the "Grand Inquest of the Nation," that the Framers
thereby manifested an intent to incorporate in the American Constitution
the same unlimited powers of inquiry vis-A-vis the executive as had
been increasingly asserted throughout the 17th and 18th centuries on
behalf of the British House of Commons as against ministers of the
Crown. It may be that he reads too much into a coincidence of language
when he finds in the frequent use of that attractive phrase a considered
purpose to transpose to the American setting an allocation of constitutional power that emerged in the British. He also takes insufficient
account of the historical and political context in which unbounded claims
for the Commons' plenary powers of inquisition were advanced; that
is, the century or so from which most of Berger's examples are taken,
which saw the achievement of parliamentary supremacy in Britain.
Indeed, Berger seems often to imply that the Framers conceived of the
American executive as little more than the agent of the legislature, on
the model of the modern British cabinet, rather than as the independent
and coequal branch of government it has conventionally been understood
to be.
In his handling of evidence of what was said and done respecting
executive privilege by principal figures of the early national period of
American history, Berger's argumentation calls to mind Santayana's
caution against resorting to history for support in the manner of looking over a crowd to pick out one's friends. The problem is not
that Berger selectively ignores instances which argte against his thesis.
Rather, the difficulty is with Berger's method of attempting to explain
away the episodes and pronouncements that might be thought to speak
against his position. He is often prone to, in Maidand's words, "mix
up two different logics, the logic of authority, and the logic of evidence." 11 The former is characterized by an insistence upon arguing
11 F.

MAITLAND,

Why the History of English Law Is No! Written, in THE

COL-
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with historical events in the manner of the advocate trying to distinguish unfavorable precedents. For example, Jefferson reported that at a
meeting of Washington's cabinet, demands by the House of Representatives for reports relating to a botched military expedition were considered. The Cabinet concluded that the President could properly refuse
to deliver papers "the disclosure of which would injure the public."'2
Is the weight of this conclusion as historical evidence lessened, as Berger
seems to believe, by the fact that Jefferson supposedly "misunderstood"
the episodes from British parliamentary history upon which he relied?
Similarly indicative of Berger's affinity for the logic of authority
rather than that of evidence is his treatment of the much-controverted
episode of the Burr subpoena. 3 If executive privilege is nothing but a
lately-concocted constitutional "myth," then how does one account for
the following responses of President Jefferson to the United States
District Attorney respecting the subpoena dices tecum for production
of the Wilkinson letters?
Reserving the necessary right of the President of the U.S. to decide,
independently of all other authority, what papers, coming to him
as President, the public interests permit to be communicated, & to
whom, I assure you of my readiness under that restriction, voluntarily to furnish on all occasions, whatever the purposes of justice
may require.Y4
All nations have found it necessary, that for the advantageous
conduct of their affairs, some of these proceedings, at least, should
remain known to their executive functionary alone. He, of course,
from the nature of the case, must be the sole judge of which of
them the public interests will permit publication3
Berger simply fails to explain why, if executive privilege is nothing
LECrED PAPERS OF FEDERIc WILLIAM MAITLAND 480, 491 (H. Fisher ed. 1911).
121

TnE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 189-90

(P.

Ford ed. 1892),

discussed by

Berger at 168-71.
13Actually, two subpoenas were issued in the course of Burr's successive trials for
treason and on a misdemeanor charge. Since by the time the second subpoena issued, the
Wilkinson letter at which it was directed had been forwarded by Jefferson to George
Hay, the U.S. Attorney, with some portions already deleted, only as to the first was
Jefferson in substance the respondent. The opinions of John Marshall, presiding as a
circuit judge at the Burr trials, setting forth his ruling on the matter, are found in United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas: 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807), and United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No.' 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). The precise chronology of this
litigation and the shifting status of the Wilkinson letter are so perplexing as to have led
even Dumas Malone, Jefferson's great biographer, into some admitted confusion. See
the exchange of letters between Malone and the ubiquitous reviewer, Wills, Book Review,
THE NEW YoR: REVIEW OF BooKs, July 18, 1974, at 36-40.
14Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, June 12, 1807, in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 55 (P. Ford ed. 1898).
'5 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, June 17, 1807, in id. at 57.
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but a latter-day fabrication, Jefferson (not usually regarded as having
entertained extravagant notions of executive prerogatives) claimed, as
President, to have discertion to withhold information when he thought
"the public interests" so required. NWas there something here that
Jefferson "misunderstood"? Berger's treatment of this episode resembles that of the advocate coping with an unfortunate decision in
point-that is, seeking to reduce what was said to mere dicta in view of
the actual result, as "the logic of authority" would entitle him to do.
But for the historian, what people say is often as important, and sometimes more so, than what they do. This would seecn to be the case here
if what Jefferson thought about executive privilege is believed to cast
some light on what the Framers intended. Vieved in its historical
significance, it scarcely matters that Jefferson did in fact supply the subpoenaed documents, especially when compliance was attended by an
emphatic reservation of his "necessary right"' 6 to remain "the sole
judge" of the occasions for non-disclosure in the interest of "the advantageous conduct of . . . affairs."1

It might be rejoined that these

words of Jefferson, which Berger relegates to a footnote, should be
discounted as those of self-interested party whose o:- was just then being
gored, but he observes no like stricture when quoting numerous congressional spokesmen on the other side of the issue.
In general, Berger's historical arguments seem most effective in
demolishing the specious efforts by others to use history to establish a
lineage for executive privilege from the original intent or understanding
of the Founding Fathers, and are least persuasive when they purport to
establish that the opposite is true. Yet it is no small service that Berger
has performed in removing, one hopes permanently, such shabby derelicts as the Rogers Memorandum' from the landscape of constitutional
history. In the final analysis, however, this revie ver is persuaded to
return nothing more conclusive than a Scotch verdict-not proven.
MAURICE J. HOLLAND, JR. t
10
17

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, June 12, 1807, in id. at 55.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, June 17, J807, in id. at 55.

18 POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, sipra note 9.
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